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A B S T R A C T
The comovement between exports and productivity observed in many countries suggest a 
direct link between these two variables. Countries which do well in their export performance 
seem also to do well in their productivity performance and vice versa. What is the nature of this 
link? Does the comovement between exports and productivity reflect a growth accounting 
identity only -  exports are a component of GDP -  or a real causal link? The paper tries to 
answer this question for four developed market economies based on the cointegration and 
causality approach.
The export-productivity link requires reexamination in face of new developments in 
econometric techniques on the one hand and new insights in trade theory on the other. The 
new technique allows to tackle with the serious problems encountered in previous attempts to 
examine the relationship, while recent trade theory suggests the relationship between trade 
and productivity to be fundamentally ambiguous. Both reasons call for more empirical 
evidence.
The findings of the econometric analysis suggest that export, productivity, and the terms of 
trade (with and without the inclusion of world output) share common trends i.e. they move 
together in the long run in all countries except the UK. Furthermore, the causality tests indicate 
that exports Granger-cause productivity in all four countries. Based on these results, the 
hypotheses of export-led growth cannot be rejected for the four countries. Thus, an 'outward 
looking' regime seems to favour productivity performance of developed market economies as 























































































































































































Casual inspection of exports and productivity in developed market economies reveals that 
these two time series move together. Countries which do well in their export performance 
seem also to do well in their productivity performance and vice versa. What is the nature of this 
link? Does the comovement between exports and productivity reflect only a growth accounting 
identity -  exports are a component of GDP -  or a real causal link?
The paper tries to answer this question for four developed market economies (US, Japan, UK, 
and Germany) based on the cointegration and causality approach recently developed. The 
former allows to study whether exports and productivity share a common trend so that they 
can be considered a long run equilibrium relationship which holds except for a stationary 
stochastic error (short run deviations). The causality analysis in turn allows to examine 
whether a causal link is present between these two variables. More specifically, the test is 
based on the criterion whether movements in exports help to predict movements in 
productivity e.g. whether exports "Granger cause" productivity.
The paper comes in five sections. Section 2 states that the exports-productivity link requires 
reexamination in face of new developments in econometric techniques on the one hand and 
new insights in trade theory on the other. The new technique allows to tackle with the serious 
problems encountered in previous attempts to examine the relationship, while recent trade 
theory suggests the relationship between trade and productivity to be fundamentally 
ambigious. Thus, the subject calls for more empirical evidence. Section 3 describes the 
methodology and characterizes the time trend and unit root properties of the data while in 
section 4 the various causality tests are performed. Finally, section 5 summarizes the results 
and suggests tentative policy conclusion. 2
2. EXPORTS AND PRODUCTIVITY
The idea that trade might influence productivity is not new. The hypothesis of "export-led 
growth" sees the growth of exports as having a stimulating influence across the economy as a 
whole in the form of technological spillovers and other externalities. Export might excert these 
externalities because export industries are seen to be prime candidates to lead for various 
reasons: exposure to international markets calls for increased efficiency and provides 
incentives for product and process innovation, the increase in specialization allows to exploit 




























































































external to the firms in the non-export sector but internal to the economy as a whole.11 Larger 
exports will contribute to the stock of knowledge and human capital in the economy thereby 
benefiting all firms. Thus, the hypothesis predicts that the rate of export growth will cause 
economy wide productivity gains.
Inspite of the fact that the export-led growth hypothesis has originally been put forward for 
developed market economies (Beckerman 1965), previous studies have confined empirical 
testing of the hypothesis to countries with low or middle per capita income (see Balassa 1978, 
Feder 1982, Kormendi and Meguire 1985).2* Since there is no a priori reason why the 
relationship should be valid only for countries defined by some development criteria, I will look 
at developed market economies with Japan and Germany as cases of relatively favourable 
productivity and export growth rates and the US and UK as countries with relatively less 
favourable records in export and productivity.
Previous attempts to examine the relationship were based on cross country correlations 
between exports and GDP (or productivity). This empirical approach involves, however, the 
problem that the correlation is not very informative since it is not clear whether the result 
reflects primarily that exports are a component of the product or a real causal link as is 
suggested by the hypothesis. Another empirical treatment is therefore required.3'
Trade theory kept mostly silent until recently on the relationship between trade and technical 
efficiency (as opposed to allocative efficiency), in the "new" trade theory technical efficiency 
and trade becomes a central link.4' Unfortunately, however, the effect of trade on technical 
efficiency is not conclusive in models of imperfect competition and increasing returs to scale. 
The trade effect will depend on the type of competition assumend on the domestic market, on 
whether entry and exit is relatively frictionless and on whether the market structure will change 
in response to a trade disturbance in a way that is conducive to improvements in productivity 
and technical efficiency. In order to see the crucial role of entry for the productivity outcome 
consider the following case. Suppose firms produce with increasing returns to scale which
1) For the different types of economies of scale see Helpman/Krugman (1985). See also Romer (1986) who 
introduces external economies of scale in a neoclassic growth model through the externality of the economy's 
capital stock. In Romer's model the output level of an individual firm depends not only on its stock of capital, but 
on the economy's capital stock. The hypothesis of export-led growth can be thought of in a framework like 
Romer's but shifting the externality from capital to exports.
2) An exception in this is Helpman and Trajtenberg (1987) who find that exports influence the growth potentials of 
countries regardless of their ranking in terms of per-capita income.
3) Feder (1982) and Helpman and Trajtenberg (1987) use a fully specified growth equation, in which the role of 
exports is modelled explicitly so that in their analysis the export variable has a clear structural interpretation.




























































































result from the existence of fixed costs for product development. Firms producing differentiated 
goods engage in monopolistic competition under free entry so that domestic price equals 
average costs since firms cannot make excess profits. With increasing returns to scale, 
average costs are a declining function of firm-level output. In such an environment an export 
expansion (however brought about) will allow domestic firms to sell larger quantities at the 
initial price, making in turn an increase in prices and an expansion of production profitable. 
This means that activities which were operating at an inefficiently small scale have been 
expanded thus increasing average productivity. However, increased profitability of the home 
production increases the returns to product development thereby inducing entry into the 
market. Induced entry of firms producing additional varieties will reduce the demand of the 
incumbent firms thereby forcing them to contract output. Whether output per firm and thus 
productivity rises or declines will depend on which of the opposing forces dominate. One 
possible outcome is the co-existence of too many firms, producing too many varieties of 
products. Thus an export expansion might crown in too many firms producing at too low levels 
of output which might dampen or reverse the original export induced productivity increase.5’
Whether a trade expansion will enhance/retard productivity growth will also depend on the 
competitive conditions on the domestic market as can be seen by the following example. 
Suppose firms on the domestic market face oligopolistic competition and behave in a Bertrand 
(price setting) fashion. Incumbent firms could increase profits by committing themselves to 
lower sales, since some of their profits are wasted by "excessive" competition. One credible 
committment to less agressive behavior is the choice of outdated or costly technology. 
Collusion is facilitated by maintaining costs artificially high. The profits to the firms from a 
greater degree of collusion can outweigh the losses in productivity. How does an export 
expansion affect the technological choice in such a framework? As the level of exports 
increases, excess profits of domestic firms increase as well. This will, in turn, reemphasize the 
strategic motive for under-investment in technology, since the potential payoffs to a strategy 
of high costs rise. Thus, an export expansion will lead to lower productivity growth, as long as 
firm's strategic behavior is conducive to an increase in costs. The export-productivity result is. 
however, not robust to changes in competitive behavior, since it relies on the assumption that 
firms compete "too agressively". The productivity outcome will be reversed if firms behave in a 
Cournot (quantity setting) fashion. Then strategic incentives will work to enhance productivity. 
There will be over-investment in technology as firms would like to precommit themselves to a 
larger scale of output. By raising profits, an export expansion will reinforce the strategic motive
5) See Flam and Helpman (1987) for the conditions for output per firm to rise in response to industrial and trade 
policy. The importance of entry/exit for the quantitative welfare effects of trade liberalizations (restrictions) is also 




























































































for over-investment thereby increasing productivity.6* The example illustrates how the export 
induced productivity effect will depend on the type of competition assumend on the domestic 
market. It also shows how innovation might be related to market structure.7*
To summarize. I conclude that the arguments given in this section suggest exports to cause 
productivity. The sign of the causal impact is. however, ambigious. Exports are supposed to 
cause productivity gains the smaller the country is and the less entry occurs. In small countries 
it is more likely that minimum efficient scale is large relative to the home market size, indicating 
that the potential for exports to allow the exploitation of economies of scale is large. 
Furthermore, productivity gains in response to an export disturbance are more likely if tougher 
competition induced by entry of new firms will on the one hand lead to the exit of 
uncompetitive firms and to an increase in X-efficiency and will create an incentive to invest in 
R&D on the other. Whether exports will cause productivity gains or losses can. in the end. only 
be decided empirically.
Empirical research on the new trade issues has proved to be a challenging exercise. Since 
data requirements are very demanding and the adequate data not yet easily available, 
econometric estimation and hypothesis testing have been precluded until now. Empirical 
studies have, therefore, employed calibration experiments. The method makes assumptions 
about economic behavior and uses econometric estimates and industry case studies to 
measure key behavioral parameters and infers then missing parameters by making the 
assumend behavior and one period's data mutually consistent (see Baldwin and Krugman 
(1986). Venables and Smith (1986), Cox and Harris (1985).
I will take a quite different route in order to explore the export-productivity relationship. Based 
on aggregate data I will employ VAR techniques which are commonly used in applied 
macroeconomics (see Sims (1972), (1980). Stock and Watson (1987). The VAR technique 
differs considerably in its philosophy from calibration methods. Calibration is theory-driven, 
while VAR is data driven. The theory-driven feature of calibration comes from maintaining 
economic behavior (such as e.g. mark-up pricing) to be true for the purpose of the empirical 
analysis and making the data consistent with the assumed behavior. The data-driven feature 
of VAR comes from letting the data "speak” without imposing theory-induced a priori 
restrictions and then looking at whether or not the data are consistend with what the theory
.6) For the argument in the context of trade policy see Rodrik (1988).
7) The relationship between market structure and innovation is one of the oldest concerns in the industrial 
organization literature. It deals with the question of whether more or less competition will be more conducive to 
R&D and innovation, see Kamien/Schwartz (1982). Recently there have been attempts to analyse the role of trade 




























































































implies. The only way theory comes in is in the choice of variables included in the time series 
analysis.8* Both techniques seem not to be adequate for testing theories, because the former 
assumes that the model is true and makes the data consistent with it. while in the latter many 
models might be consistent with the data.
3. TREND PROPERTIES OF THE DATA
In order to explore the comovement of exports and productivity I begin by characterizing the 
time trend and unit root properties of the data included in the analysis since the neutrality and 
causality tests are sensitive to unit roots in the series (see Sims. Stock and Watson (1986)). 
The data consist of quarterly observations on the log of exports of manufacturing goods (x), 
the log of labour productivity (manufacturing output per employee) (pr). the log of the terms of 
trade (export unit value divided by import unit value for manufacturing goods in local currency 
(tot), and the log of OECD output at constant prices (q). Since all variables are treated as 
endogenous in a first stage. OECD output and the terms of trade are included in the time 
series analysis in order to control for export growth which results either from price 
competitiveness or from growth in the world economy. The terms of trade is also supposed to 
detect possible linkages of the real exchange rate (and possible effects of trade policy in the 
form of tariff and non-tariff barriers if they are reflected in the terms of trade) on productivity; a 
link much stressed by the literature on the "new" trade issues and by the “hysteresis" model of 
trade (see Grossman and Richardson (1985) and Baldwin and Krugman (1986)).
3.1 Testing for Integration
A key step in understanding the comovement of exports and productivity is to find out first 
whether each of the series contain a stochastic trend and second whether they share a 
common stochastic trend. The former is called a test whether a series is integrated of order d 
l(d), while the latter refers to a test whether two or more variables are cointegrated.
A variable is said to be integrated of order one 1(1) if it must be differenced one time to be 
stationary.9* To test for integration the following regression is formed
8) This is controversial, see Learner (1985).
9) A time series random variable is said to be stationary if its distribution does not depend on time. A variable that is 
integrated is said to have a unit root in its autoregressive representation. Thus, the statements has a unit root" 




























































































PAzt - P zt_x + 6j AZt_j + et (1 )
where p is selected to be large enough to ensure that the residual e, is empirically white noise. 
The test statistic is the ratio of p to its calculated standard error obtained from an OLS 
regression. The null hypothesis is HQ: Zj - 1(1). that is Zj is not stationary in levels. The null is 
rejected if p is negative and significantly different from zero. The test-statistic does not have a 
t—distribution under the null, because of the theoretically infinite variance of zt , but tables of 
significance levels have been provided by Dickey and Fuller (1979).
Table 1 investigates the possiblity that the series x. pr, tot. and q might have up to two unit 
roots for Germany, the UK. the USA and Japan. The first block presents the Dickey-Fuller 
tests (with p=0) and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (with p=4) for a single unit root. In no 
case is there significant evidence against the unit root hypothesis. Thus, the null hypothesis 
that the series are not stationary in levels cannot be rejected. The block B shows the result of 
the Dickey-Fuller (1979) tests for a second unit root, i.e. for a unit root in the first difference of 
the series, allowing for the alternative that the series are stationary in first differences. 
According to these tests, no series contains two unit roots. In other words, since all series for 
the four countries have significant test statistics, the null hypothesis that the series are not 
stationary in first differences has to be rejected. Thus, exports, productivity, the terms of trade 
and OECD output appear to be 1(1). i.e. to contain a stochastic trend over the 1960.1 -  1987.2 
sample, a feature that they share with most macroeconomic time series.101 10*
10) When variables contain stochastic trends, as most macroeconomic series do. the distinction between "trend"
and "cycle" becomes blurred. Changes in growth trends seem to be associated with some of the shorter
"cyclical" swings in the series suggesting that there is an important connection between them, see Nelson and
































































































Series GERMANY UK USA JAPAN
A single unit root
OP ADF DF ADF DF ADF DF ADF DF ADF
* -1.6 -1.6 -0.29 -0.22 -0.86 -0.82 -2.9 -2.4
pr -1.3 -1.3 -1.5 -1.5 -0.15 -0.11 -1.9 -1.5
tot -1.8 -2.4 -1.2 -2.3 -0.94 -0.99 -1.3 -2.0
* : -3.1i -2.1
B- second unit root
DF ADF DF ADF DF ADF DF ADF DF ADF
A * -10.0 -5.4 -13.6 -3.8 -12.3 -3.3 -5.7 -3.9
Apr -10.9 -5.0 -9.7 -3.7 -8.8 -4.2 -8.1 -5.6
A tot «*>CO -4.7 -7.2 -5.3 -7.1 -5.2 -6.2 -5.2
Aq _ -4.7
p
Notes: DF, ADF -Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller Test: A * t *  ̂* t ^ zt j + et
with p»0 for DF and p » 4 for ADF j *1
Critical values for the tests at the 1* and 5* significance level, respectively are -4.07 (DF). 




























































































з. 2 Testing for Cointegration
Since all series appear to contain a stochastic trend the question arises whether they contain 
a common stochastic trend. If that were the case, then changes in the “trend" of e.g. 
productivity observed in the early 70's would appear as shifts in exports (and the terms of 
trade and world output) as well, indicating that exports and productivity move together in the 
long run. Testing for cointegration is a way of testing the long-term relatedness between time 
series that have individually a unit root.
Two variables are said to be cointegrated of order one Cl(1,1), if they are idividually 1(1). but 
some linear combination of the two is l(0) (see Engle and Granger 1987). In our case we want 
to test if it exists a linear combination of x and pr (with or without the inclusion of tot and q)
ut = xt - a  prt (2)
which reduces the number of unit roots implying that the low frequency components of x, and 
pr, would virtually cancel out to produce the mean-reverting so-called "equilibrium error" u,. 
Hence, in order to test for cointegration between x and pr a test is required for whether or not
и, is stationary. If u, follows an integrated process of order zero l(0), it can be concluded that a 
long-run equilibrium condition holds for x and pr (x -  apr = 0). except for a stationary 
disturbance u, with finite variance. In other words, deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
condition will show mean reversal, even if there is not such a tendency in exports and 
productivity. If x and pr are cointegrated, the long-run elasticity of productivity with respect to 
exports can be estimated without specifying any dynamics and without deciding a priori the 
direction of causality, since both variables are endogenous and can be treated symmetrically.
In order to test for cointegration the "cointegration regression" (equation 2) is estimated using 
OLS.11) The null hypothesis of no cointegration, is tested based on the Durbin-Watson 
statistic (CRDW), but testig whether CRDW is significantly greater than zero. An alternative 
way is to perform the Dickey-Fuller tests (DF. ADF) for the estimated residual u,. assuming 
that a first order model is correct. All three tests are reported in Table 3. while the cointegrating 
regressions are shown in Table 2.
In the cointegrating regression of x on pr alone (equations 4. 10. 16 and 22 in Table 2) the 
coefficient of x ranged between .26 and .44 in the four countries examined. In the reversed 
regression of pr on x. the coefficient of pr ranged between 2.2 and 3.63. which has reciprocal
11) If variables are cointegrated. OLS gives a consistent and efficient estimate of the cointegrating coefficient as has 




























































































between .27 and .45. about the same as the coefficients in the forward regression (see 
equations 1,7,13 and 19 in Table 2). However, the CRDW and DF indicate that the data fail to 
reject the null of non-cointegration at any significance level below 10 per cent (the critical 
value at 10% for 100 observations of the CRDW is 0.322 and of the DF -3.03 as tabulated by 
Engle and Granger 1987). For the German and Japanese data the ADF accepts cointegration 
at the 5 per cent level while for the UK and the USA the ADF does not reject the null even at 
the 10 per cent level (critical values of ADF are -3.17 and -2.84 at the 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively)121 (See Table 3).
Since cointegration between x and pr alone fails to be accepted for the four countries (at least 
on the basis of DF and CRDW) I proceed by including the terms of trade (tot) in the 
cointegrating regression. Apart from the UK. tests for cointegration among these three 
variables reject now the null that the series are not cointegrated, suggesting that the trivariate 
specifications have less unit roots than variables. Since the cointegrating vector constitutes an 
equilibrium, the tests should not give different results when the cointegrating equation is 
estimated in its different inversions. This is indeed confirmed by the data in the trivariate case, 
since the tests indicate cointegration (or fail to indicate as with UK data) independently of 
whether x or pr has been used as the dependent variable in the regression (see Table 3). 12



























































































































































































































































































System Unit Roots under DF ADF CRDU
Null and Alternative
GERMANY
x.pr 2 vs 1 -2.6 -3.2 .25
x,pr,tot 3 vs 2 -2.9 -3.3 .32
x.pr.tot.q 4 vs 3 -2.8 -3.3 .30
pr.x 2 vs 1 -2.7 -3.3 .25
pr.x,tot 3 vs 2 -3.0 -3.5 .33
pr.x.tot.q 4 vs 3 -3.1 -3.8 .44
UK
x.pr 2 vs 1 -1.4 -1.4 .12
x.pr,tot 3 vs 2 -1.7 -1.7 .14
x.pr,tot.q 4 vs 3 -1.6 -1.7 .15
pr., 2 vs 1 -1.2 -1.2 .12
pr.x,tot 3 vs 2 -1.6 -1.6 .15
pr.x,tot.q 4 vs 3 -1.5 -1.4 . 1.9
USA
x.pr 2 vs 1 -1.5 -2.5 .09
x.pr.tot 3 vs 2 -4.0 -3.9 .55
x.pr,tot.q 4 vs 3 -4.8 -5.2 .71
pr.x 2 vs 1 -1.3 -2.5 .09
pr.x,tot 3 vs 2 -3.4 -3.3 .44
pr.x,tot.q 4 vs 3 -2.1 -2.2 .24
JAPAN
x.pr 2 vs 1 -2.0 -3.8 .16
x.pr,tot 3 vs 2 -3.1 -5.0 .37
x.pr,tot.q 4 vs 3 -2.8 -4.6 .31
pr.x 2 vs 1 -2.0 -4.0 .16
pr.x.tot 3 vs 2 -3.1 -5.1 .34
pr.x,tot.q 4 vs 3 -3.1 -4.6 ,3
Notes: CRDW-cointegration Regression Durbin-Uatson statistic, DF-Dickey-Fuller Test: ^  ut ' ut j * Et
4
ADF-Augmented Dickey Fuller Test: A ut ■ -0  ̂♦ I b^A  ̂ ♦ €t
J- l
Critical values for the tests in the 2 variable case at the 5* and 10* significance level, respectively are: 





























































































Looking at the regressions of x and tot on pr. we find .33. .42 and .52 for x. and .19. 1.16, and 
.43 for tot. for Germany, USA and Japan, respectively suggesting that exports and productivity 
on the one hand and productivity and the terms of trade on the other are positively related in 
the long run (see equations 5, 17, and 23 in Table 2). Although the reverse regressions of pr 
and tot on x give the same cointegration results, they give different estimates of the equilibrium 
prameters i.e. the equilibrium is not unique. One interpretation of this result might be to let 
these estimates define the limits of an equilibrium sub-space, so that the true long-run 
equilibrium might be anywhere whithin the area defined by these points. An alternative view is 
given by Stock (1987) who establishes that the estimates of the cointegrating regression are 
consistent but subject to a finite sample bias. This bias is supposed to be related to the overall 
goodness of fit of the regression suggesting that the regression with the highest R2 should be 
subject to the smallest bias. Since the R2,s do not differ, they do not offer themselves as 
criteria for choosing the specification with the smallest bias, so that we are left with the first 
interpretation of not unique equilibrium relationships.
The inclusion of OECD output q in the cointegration regression does not change the picture 
considerably. The DF. ADF. and CRDW tests have increased in some of the cases and 
declined in others. But again, the hypothesis that x, pr, tot and q are not a cointegrated vector 
has to be rejected for Germany, the USA and Japan, while it fails to be rejected for the UK. It is 
worth noting that in one of the cases (with US data) the inversion of the regression failed to 
lead to consistent cointegration results. We nevertheless interprete that these four variables 
are cointegrated in the US, since we could find at least one cointegrated vector. The estimated 
equilibrium parameters drop now to .18. .26. and .18 for x and to -.07. .67 and .06 for tot. for 
Germany. USA and Japan, respectively, while the coefficient of q varied between .30 and 1.05 
in the three countries (excluding the UK) suggesting that productivity and OECD output is 
positively related in the long run.
Summarizing these results, all variables included in the analysis can be characterized as being 
1(1) i.e. they have a single unit root. While pr and x alone do not share a common trend, 
(pr.x.tot) and (pr.x.tot.q) constitute a cointegrated vector in all countries except the UK. The 





























































































Having characterized the trend properties of the data, we can now turn to their causal 
orderings, x is said to cause y if the forecast for y is improved (has a smaller mean square 
error) by using additionally the history of x than by using just the history of y alone (see 
Granger 1969). This means that the hypothesis that x causes y can be examined by estimating
P(E e± L1 )yt
i  = l
Z
+ ( z  Hu l J )  X t
j=l J
+ ( 3 )
and testing whether the lj)  are jointly significantly different from zero based on an F-test 
of the OLS regression.13* The test requires that the disturbance term s ( is close to being white 
noise which involves a careful choice of suitable values of p and z. The order of own lags (the 
value of p) has been estimated by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). while 4 (6 or 8) lags 
have been included for the other variables in the VAR.14* Besides the correct treatment of the 
lag structure the causality test requires mean zero stationary variables. Otherwise the F- 
statistics will have nonstandard distributions (see Sims. Stock and Watson 1986 who offer 
alternative test statistics when variables have unit roots).
Before turning to the empirical results, it is worth noting two points. First, all four variables 
included in the analysis appear to have a unit root. Second, the four variables constitute a 
cointegrated vactor (excluding the UK) so that they can bee seen to have been generated by 
an ’error-correction' model as described by Engle and Granger (1987). This has three 
implications for the causality tests. First, the appropriate way to detrend the series is to take 
first differences (in our case fourth differences in order to get rid also of possible saisonality in 
the data) and by doing so they become mean zero, stationary variables.Second, the standard 
asymptotic distribution theory can be used to interpret the F-tests in the causality procedure, 
since all variables are mean zero, stationary. Third, an error-correction term has to be included 
in the VAR's in those cases in which the variables have common stochastic trends which 
captures the extend to which the system is out of equilibrium. Moreover, cointegration 
between two or more variables is already sufficient for the presence of causality at least in one 
direction.That cointegration already implies causality seems somewhat surprising, since 
cointegration is concerned with the long run and equilibrium, whereas causality refers to
13) The concept of causality to which we refer is narrow, since it is based only on the zero restrictions in a VAR. For 
deeper interpretations of causality, predictability and exogeneity see Geweke (1984).
14) BIC is defined as log o2 + (p+q) where o2^  is the estimated variance of the innovations in the ARMA 
process of order (p.q) and T is the sample size. The procedure searches over different values of p and q wihtin a 




























































































short-run forecastability. The intuition behind it is that for two or more series to have an 
attainable long-run equilibrium, there must be some causation between them to provide the 
necessary dynamics. If the error-correction term is not included in the VAR when the series 
are cointegrated, on some occasions one would not detect causation when it is. in fact, 
present (see Granger 1988).
The results of the causality tests are presented in Table 5. Additionally Table 4 is giving the 
sum of the corefficients on lagged variables included in the VAR's in order to look at whether 
e.g. detrended export and terms of trade growth is found to be non-neutral in the sense that a 
permanent increase in the level of detrended export and terms of trade growth lead to a 
permanent increase (decrease) in productivity.15* Four different specifications of the causality 
tests have been performed: with and without an error-correction term (ec) taking into account 
that the series are cointegrated: with and without the inclusion of a deterministic time trend 
allowing for the possiblity that some of the series are stationary in first differences around a 
linear time trend.16*
Focusing first on the productivity equation at the lower part of Table 4 and 5. exports appear to 
'Granger-cause' productivity in all four countries (independently of specifications) at either the 
1% or 5% siginificance level. Thus, the inclusion of past information on x improves the forecast 
for pr. However, the quantitiative impact of exports on productivity (pr.x) seems to be negligible 
as the sum of the coefficients of lagged exports in the productivity equations indicate. Z/3pn 
ranges between -.13 and .03 with positive signs for Germany and negative ones for the three 
other countries.17*
The predictive role of the terms of trade for productivity finds support only for the UK data with 
improvements in the terms of trade (an increase in the real exchange rate) dampening 
productivity. The £/3pr10t's vary between -.15 and -.22 depending on specifications. That 
increases in the real exchange rate retard productivity growth seems also to be the case in the 
other countries, although the effect is not statistically significant below the 10% level (the p- 
vaiues range between 12.7 and 53.1 depending on specification and country).
15) For transitory and permanent effects of exports on productivity see Marin (1989). and for Tables of the estimated 
VAR's see Marin (1988).
16) When regressing the first difference of each of the series against a constant, time and four of it own lags the t-  
statistics on the time trend have been significant for OECD output and Japanese exports suggesting that q and 
x-Japan may be well described by a single unit root and a quadratic time trend.





























































































EXPORT PRODUCTIVITY NEUTRALITY: E0ZZ
a *t ' a p r t-j «A *ott ■i>
GERMANY UK USA JAPAN
Specification & ju£ £ x. tot A £ £ x. tot x. tot Ai_a x. tot aua
const:A * -0.32 -0.29 0.56 -0.18 -0.68 -0.24 -0.13 -0.69 0.47 0.14 -0.3 0.53
const;A zt;t -0.27 -0.30 0.46 -0.56 -1.1 0.28 -0.16 -0.67 0.53 0.14 -0.29 0.42
const;A z^iec -0.36 -0.28 0.51 -0.39 -0.64 -0.27 -0.3 -0.15 0.27 0.10 -0.30 0.59
const:A  z ̂ ;ec;t -0.05 -0.29 0.38 -0.77 -1.0 0.28 -0.3 -0.16 0.32 0.05 -0.28 0.45
Aprt f (Aprfc-j-A V ]• At°tt_j.Aq t-J)
GERMANY UK USA JAPAN
Specification BX^A or.tot or.a BX^A cr.tot pr.a BX^A or.tot or.g BX^A pr.tot pr.g
const;A 0.03 -0.06 0.21 -0.1 -0.15 -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 -0.003 0.18
const:A z^:t 0.01 -0.06 0.14 -0.13 -0.19 -0.00 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.13
const;A z^iec 0.02 0.04 1.09 -0.12 -0.21 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.12
const:A z^iecjt -0.04 -0.06 0.17 -0.13 -0.22 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.09
Notes: The order of own lags for A* and Apr Is determined by the BIC criterion, all other regressors include 4 





























































































EXPORT-PRODUCTIVITY CAUSALITY TESTS: F-STATISTICS AND P-VALUES
A,t- A PVj.A t»tt_rAV )
Specification x.pr
GERMANY 
X. tot X-3 x.pr
UK
». tot L_S *.er
USA 
X. tot 1^3 x.pr
JAPAN 
x. tot 2^3
































































































A prt -f (Aprt-j’AV j -j•A qt-
Specification BJT.l
GERMANY 
or.tot pr. g pr,*
UK





















































const jAẑ .-ec 3.2 1.9
'
(1.7) (12.7) (.96) (.09) (2.0) (.6) (2.1) (22.3) (94.5) (3.1) (35.4) (9.2)
























Notes: p-values appear in parentheses. The p-value indicates the probability of obtaining an F-ratio at least as 
large as the test statistic under the null. A p-value smaller than 5 indicates rejection of the null of no 




























































































Looking at the relation beween pr and q, the null hypothesis of no causality has to be rejected 
except tor the US and possibly Japan. While the sum of the coefficients of lagged OECD 
output is positive in Germany and Japan, the sign is negative for the UK and the US. That 
there is an independent causal linkage between OECD output and productivity not mediated 
via exports, might be an indication of international increasing returns to scale as described by 
Ethier (1979) in which productivity of an industry depends on the size of the world market 
rather than the domestic market as long as middle products are traded.
Focusing next on the export equations at the upper part of Table 4 and 5. one finds a 
predictive role of the terms of trade (price competitiveness) for exports (x.tot) in all countries 
except the US either the 1% or 5% significance level. Productivity is Granger causing exports 
(x.pr) only in Japan (at the 10% level), and the inclusion of lagged OECD output improves the 
forecast of exports (x, q) in Japan only.
It is woth noting that the specification does matter for the causality test results. The inclusion 
of the error-correction terms and/or the time trend have changed the p-values and F- 
statistics considerably in most cases, although the basic results do not depend on the 
specification. It almost never happend that one specification rejected the null of no causality, 
while another specification failed to do so (except for (x.q). (pr.q) in Germany and Japan).
Since export disturbances might take some time until they affect productivity as the 
productivity effect is supposed to take place via changes in market structure. I have increased 
the number of lags of export growth from four to eight (for the US and Japanese data) and 
from four to six (for the UK and German data) in order to account for longer term influences. In 
all countries, upon increasing the number of lags of exports, the sum of the estimated 
coefficients X/3^ remains more or less the same (shown in the bottom part of Table 6). In 
contrast, increasing the export lag lenght sharply changes the Granger causality F-tests.18* 
Now, exports Granger causes productivity only at the 10% level in Germany and Japan, while 
the F-statistics have become much larger for US data and have remained the same only for 
the UK. Thus, the general result that exports cause productivity remains valid. Focusing on the 
terms of trade-productivity link, it appears that, besides the UK, the terms of trade has become 
now a predictive role for productivity in the US as well (even at the 1% significance level). The 
causal linkage between OECD output and productivity has become weaker in Germany (but





























































































still.remains significant somewhat around the 5% level) and has become stronger in Japan (it 
is now significant at the 5% level).19*
Summarizing these results, in all countries, labour productivity is Granger-caused by exports, 
independent of specification and lag lenght. The sum of coefficients of lagged exports is. 
however, not much different from zero (between -.14 and .01) indicating that the quantitative 
effect of exports on productivity is not great. Causality from the terms of trade to productivity 
has been identified for the UK and the US (depending on lag lenght of exports) with 
deteriorations in the terms of trade (devaluations of the real exchange rate) favouring 
productivity (the sum of coefficients of lagged tot is around -.20). With the exception of the US. 
in all other countries a direct causal link from OECD output to productivity has proved to be 
statistically significant (independently of specification and lag lenght) with increases in OECD 
output improving productivity in Japan and Germany (with the sum of coefficients of lagged q 
ranging between .09 and 1.09 depending on specification and lag lenght) and tending to retard 
productivity in the UK (sum of coefficient estimates between -0.1 and -0.5). Additionally, price 
competitiveness Granger caused exports in all countries except the US. OECD output in Japan 
and Germany only, while productivity Granger caused exports in Japan only.
19) The stronger causality results for some of the variables when the lag lenght of exports is increased stand in 





























































































Aprt = f(Aprt_j, A xt_j, Atott_j, A Qt_j )
EXPORT-PRODUCTIVITY CAUSALITY AND NEUTRALITY TESTS
6 or 8 lags of x and 4 lags of tot and q
A: Causality Tests: F-statistics and P-values
GERMANY UK USA JAPAN
Specification ST.» pr.tot pr. c pr.x pr.tot pr.g pr.» pr.tot pr.q PX..» pr.tot pr. g
const 1 .8 1 1 .1 2 2 .4 9 4 .0 5 3 .7 8  3 .7 8 3 .7 4 3 .7 2 .6 0 1 .6 7 .8 8 3 .2 8
(1 0 .7 7 ) (3 5 .2 5) (4 .9 8) (.1 7) (.8 2 ) (.8 2) (.10) (.8 0 ) (6 6 .6 4 ) (1 1.9 2 ) (4 7 .9 5 ) (1 .5 5)
const :Azt;ec 1 .9 9 .84 2 .6 5 3 .7 6 2 .9  3 .4 0 3 .6 4 3 .8 5 .57 1 .8 5 .99 2 .5 9
(7 .7 7 ) (5 0.4 1 ) (5 .4 8) (.3 0 ) (2 .7 8 ) (1 .4 2) (.12) (.6 6) (6 8 .3 1 ) (8 .9 4 ) (4 2 .0 2 ) (4 .3 2)
B: Neutrality: %PZZ
GERMANY UK USA JAPAN
Specification pr.i pr.tot pr. q pr.» pr.tot pr.q EX.» pr.tot pr. q pr.» pr.tot pr.q
const;Az^ .01 - .0 2 .18 - .1 4 - .1 9  - .0 1 - .1 2 - .2 2 - .0 9 .01 - .0 3 .28
const :A*t:ec - . 0 8 - .0 1 .2 0 - .1 4 - .2 3  - .0 1 - .1 3 - .2 1 - .1 0 .0 1 - .0 4 .25
Notes: For the USA and Japan 8 lags oi Ax and for the UK and Germany 6 lags of A* have been included




























































































5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the relationship between exports, productivity, the terms of trade and 
world output for four OECD countries based on the cointegration and causality concept. The 
findings of the econometric analysis can be summarized as follows. Exports, productivity, and 
the terms of trade (with and without the inclusion of world output) share common trends, i.e. 
they move togehter in the long run in all countries except the UK. The signs of the estimated 
equilibrium parameters in the cointegrating regressions indicate that exports, the terms of 
trade and world output are all positively related to productivity in the long-run. Furthermore, 
the causality F-tests suggest that exports Granger-cause productivity in all four countries. 
Based on these results, I conclude that the hypothesis of export-led growth cannot be 
rejected for the US. Japan, UK and Germany. An 'outward looking' regime seems to favour 
productivity performance of developed market economies as well and seems, therefore, not to 
be restricted to developing countries only as commonly asserted. The findings might also be 
an explanation for the favourable productivity performance in Japan and Germany and the 
relatively poor one in the US and UK. Exports seem to have played a role here.
Moreover, the positive long-run relation between the terms of trade and productivity, and the 
significant causal link from the terms of trade to productivity in the US and UK suggest that 
improvements in the terms of trade (revaluations of the real exchange rate) have enhanced 
productivity in these two countries. Interpreting this result, increases in the real exchange rate 
might have induced entry of foreign low-cost producers into the British and US market leading 
to the exit of high-cost domestic producers giving rise to improvements in average 
productivity. If the number of firms declines as a result, the productivity effect might work via 
two channels. First, through the exit of low-productivity firms. Second, through the scale effect 
of production, since the market share of the exiting firms is taken by the incumbent firms which 
might lead to increased output per firm. Output per firm will increase only, however, if price 
elasticities of exports are sufficiently low preventing overall output from declining substantially 
due to reduced exports. Additionally, the real exchange rate might have lowered 'X- 
inefficiency1 (if present) by creating an environment in which managerial effort and risk taking 
behavior is increased. The story is consistent with the data. Whether it is, in fact, the right one 
cannot be decided on the basis of the empirical evidence presented.
Given these results for the UK and US, the exchange rate might play a productivity enhancing 
role in two different ways. Either through devaluations of the real exchange rate boosting 
productivity via exports (the terms of trade as a proxy for price competitiveness has. however, 




























































































revaluations of the real exchange rate improving productivity through the rationalization of 
production of the import competing sector at the disadvantage of the export sector201.
And finally, world output proved to Granger cause productivity independently of exports in all 
countries except the US which might be an indication of international increasing returns to 
scale in which productivity of an industry depends on the size of the world market rather than 
the domestic market.
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